ABSTRACT Advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) networks allow the data collection of consumers' fine-grained power consumption data (PCD) to perform real-time monitoring and energy management. However, PCD can leak sensitive information about consumers' activities. Various privacy-preserving data collection schemes have been proposed for AMI networks to allow the collection of an aggregated PCD to preserve consumers' privacy. However, most of these schemes are designed for single-recipient AMI networks and cannot be used efficiently for multi-recipient AMI networks in which several entities should have access to the aggregated PCD of different sets of users for legitimate uses. In this paper, we propose an efficient and privacy-preserving data collection and access control scheme for multi-recipient AMI networks named EPDA. We developed a novel proxy re-encryption scheme that allows data aggregation before reencryption and can allow either full or partial access to the aggregated data after re-encryption as needed. The proposed scheme can be used for fine-grained access control for multi-recipient AMI networks in which each recipient can access only the data intended to it. The EPDA uses lightweight operations in encryption, aggregation, and decryption which result in low computation and communication overheads. Our security analysis demonstrates that the EPDA is secure, can resist collusion attacks and hide customers' distribution which is needed for a fair electricity trade market. Our experimental results confirm that the EPDA has improved performance for the computational cost at each entity in the AMI network and low communication overhead.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional power grids are obsolete and vulnerable to blackouts. Recent reports indicated that the power outages cost the United States (U.S.) at least 150 billion dollars each year [1] . Also, the north-east blackout in August 2003, which lasted for a week, affected over 100 power plants and about 55 million people [2] . Investigations showed that this blackout could be avoided if the grid could provide effective real-time diagnostic support [3] .
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The smart grid (SG) is the next generation of the traditional power grid and the way for innovations in the electric sector [4] , [5] . It uses information and communication technologies to provide two-way communications between the grid's entities to ensure the efficient and reliable operation of the grid [6] . Figure 1 shows the conceptual architecture of the SG. The figure shows several processes through which electricity is generated and transferred to electricity consumers, or simply ''users''. Electricity generation is the process of generating electric power from several source. Transmission is the bulk movement of electrical energy from generation sites to distribution substations through VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/ FIGURE 1. The smart grid conceptual architecture with multi-recipient AMI network [28] .
transmission networks which are maintained by a transmission system operator (TSO). Distribution is the final stage in the delivery of electric power through distribution networks that carry electricity from distribution substations to individual users. These networks are operated and maintained by distribution network operators (DNOs).
One of the main components of the SG is the advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) networks that allow secure information flow and enable the automated collection of metering data [7] - [9] . Figure 1 shows an AMI network model in which smart meters (SMs) installed at users' sides are connected to grid operators through a hierarchical network structure that consists of building area networks (BANs), neighborhood area networks (NANs), wide area networks (WANs) and a data communications company (DCC). AMI networks allows the collection of fine-grained power consumption data (PCD) of electricity consumers at high rates, e.g., few minutes. Then, multi entities, e.g. grid operators and electricity suppliers, can analyze the collected PCD for real-time grid monitoring and energy management [10] - [13] . For example, fine-grained data analysis can be used for the reduction of the peak-to-average ratio, which can help in preventing brownouts, an electricity reduction in a particular area, and blackouts, a failure to supply electricity [14] . Also, fine-grained PCD are needed for real-time pricebased demand/response programs in which electricity prices depends on the supply-to-demand ratio especially during peak hours [15] , [16] .
Despite the aforementioned benefits of fine-grained PCD collection, it creates serious privacy issues to users as these PCD can reveal users' daily activities. For example, nonintrusive load monitoring for PCD patterns can reveal sensitive information about users such as the times at which they leave/return homes, as well as, the appliances they use since each appliance has a unique power consumption signature [17] - [19] . According to the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), determining users' personal activities is a serious privacy concern in smart grid and thus fine-grained PCD should be protected from unauthorized access [20] .
In order to preserve users' privacy, data aggregation has been widely used for AMI networks [21] - [30] . Specifically, users' PCD should be aggregated such that grid operators can only obtain an aggregated PCD (APCD) of a group of users in order to monitor and maintain the grid while preserving users' privacy. In addition, in order to prevent the intermediate nodes between users and the grid entities from accessing the individual PCD, several techniques can be used such as PCD masking [21] - [24] and homomorphic encryption [25] - [29] .
One main limitation in most of the data collection schemes is that they are designed for single-recipient AMI network in which only a single entity should receive the APCD. A competitive electricity market, which is deployed in most European countries [31] and several states in the U.S. [32] , allows energy deregulation, i.e., it allows electricity retailing through different electricity suppliers. Therefore, multiple entities, e.g. TSO, DNOs and electricity suppliers, should have access to the APCD of different sets of users for legitimate uses as will be explained in subsection III-C, and thus a data collection and access control scheme is needed for multirecipient AMI network. As will be explained in section II, if existing schemes, such as [21] - [27] , when applied to the multi-recipient AMI networks are inefficient and not scalable. Moreover, they allow aggregators to learn the customers' distribution of each supplier within their areas, i.e., the number of users of each suppliers in each area. Aggregators can share customers' distribution of a supplier with other competitors such that they can modify their plans to attract competitors' customers. Such information should be hidden from competitors to ensure fair electricity trade market [33] , [34] .
In order to address the aforementioned limitations, we propose in this paper an Efficient and Privacy-preserving Data collection and Access control scheme for multi-recipient AMI network named ''EPDA''. In EPDA, each SM encrypts its PCD such that it can be aggregated only with other encrypted PCD (EPCD) intended for the same recipient. Then, to reduce communication overhead, all the ciphertexts are aggregated together into a single ciphertext instead of sending one aggregated ciphertext for each recipient in the network. Since all the APCD intended to all recipients are contained in a single aggregated ciphertext, we propose a novel data re-encryption scheme to allow fine-grained access control, i.e., each recipient can access only the APCD intended to it and cannot access the APCD intended for other recipients.
The novelty and contributions of this work can be summarized as follows.
1) We developed a novel proxy re-encryption scheme that allows data aggregation before re-encryption and can allow full or partial access to the aggregated data after re-encryption as needed. This scheme can be used to ensure fine-grained access control for multi-recipient AMI networks in which each recipient can access only the data intended to it. 2) EPDA provides higher privacy protection than the similar existing scheme [28] , [29] . Specifically, EPDA not only protects the individual users' privacy by hiding their individual PCD, but also hides the customers' distribution of each supplier which cannot be achieved in [28] and [29] . 3) In [28] , electricity suppliers cannot ensure the correctness of the APCD they receive if the DNO colludes with the DCC. EPDA can resist this type of collusion attack. 4) Compared to [28] and [29] , EPDA uses lightweight operations in encryption, aggregation and decryption which results in better performance than the existing schemes in terms of communication and computation overheads. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Related works are discussed in Section II. The considered system models and the design requirements are presented in Section III. Preliminaries are given in Section IV. The proposed data collection and access control scheme is explained in Section V The security analysis and performance evaluation are given in Sections VI and VII, respectively. Conclusions are drawn in Section VIII. For better readability, Table 1 lists all the acronyms used in the paper. We used some acronyms similar to those used in [28] .
II. RELATED WORKS
Several schemes have been proposed to ensure privacypreserving data collection for AMI networks through data aggregation [21] - [30] . The schemes proposed in [21] - [24] uses one-time masking to mask PCD such that when the masked PCD are aggregated, masks cancel each other and an APCD can be obtained. These schemes differ in the way the secret masks are generated. The schemes proposed in [25] - [29] uses the additive homomorphic property of the Paillier cryptosystem [35] to preserve users' privacy. In these schemes, each user should encrypt his PCD using the Paillier cryptosystem, then an AEPCD can be computed in the ciphertext domain. Finally, the APCD can be recovered through a decryption process.
Most of the above data collection schemes are designed for single-recipient AMI network [21] - [27] . In order to apply them for the multi-recipient network, each meter needs to encrypt its PCD twice, one with the public key of its electricity supplier and the other with the public key of its DNO. Then, aggregators should aggregate the ciphertext intended to the same supplier/DNO together. However, this naive idea requires high communication overhead because the size of the aggregated ciphertexts increases linearly with the number of recipients in the network. Also, it imposes double the computation overhead for encryption. Therefore, they are inefficient and unscalable. Furthermore, the aggregators must learn the customers distribution of each supplier to achieve the functional requirement of the multi-recipient AMI network. This information can be misused if shared with other competitor suppliers as mentioned earlier.
Secure multi-party computation (SMC) based aggregation schemes were developed to achieve privacy through secret sharing and data aggregation [36] - [38] . The idea of SMC was introduced first in [39] where each node splits its data into k blocks such that the sum of all k blocks is equal to the node's data value. Then, it randomly selects k − 1 other nodes and sends to each of them a distinctive block. The receiving nodes should aggregate the blocks they receive and transmit the result to the next node and so on. Conventionally, SMC-based schemes incur extremely high communication overhead and limit the network scalability due to transmitting shares to all other network nodes. VOLUME 7, 2019 Few schemes addressed the data collection problem for multi-recipient [28] , [29] . The scheme in [28] uses Paillier cryptosystem to encrypt users PCD only once with the public key of the intended DNO. In order to enable the DNO to distribute the aggregated data to the intended suppliers, SMs must send the ID of its supplier to the aggregators. For N s suppliers in the network, aggregators must classify the received ciphertexts into N s groups based on the suppliers' IDs, aggregate each group of ciphertext together, and then send N s aggregated ciphertexts to each DNO. Finally, each DNO should decrypt the received N s ciphertexts to obtain the APCD and then re-distribute these APCD to the suppliers. Similar idea can be used by [29] using attribute based encryption (ABE) [40] along with Paillier cryptosystem. Specifically, each SM encrypts its PCD using the Paillier cryptosystem with the public key of a trusted central node and creates an access policy to identify which entities can access its PCD. Then, EPCD with the same attributes in an access policy are aggregated together. Then central trusted node decrypts all the received Paillier ciphertexts and reencrypts each APCD using ABE [40] based on the associated access policy to ensure access control. Finally, any entity that can satisfy that access policy of an ABE ciphertext can access the aggregated data.
These schemes suffer from the following limitations. First, since they allow aggregators to classify the ciphertexts, BAN-GWs, controlled by the DCC, can learn the customers' distribution of each supplier in each area. This information can be misused if shared with other competitor suppliers as mentioned earlier. On contrary, EPDA allows the aggregators to aggregate all the ciphertexts intended to all recipients into a single ciphertext without allowing aggregators to learn the customers' distribution of any supplier. In addition, sending several aggregated ciphertexts, one ciphertext for each supplier as in [28] or one for each attribute set as in [29] , increases the communication overhead dramatically. Furthermore, in [28] , if the DCC is an active adversary, it can collude with the DNO to deceive an electricity supplier such that the supplier pays the DNO higher distribution network fees. On contrary, this type of collusion is not possible in EPDA as will be explained in subsection VI-D.
In [30] , Mustafa et al. proposed a privacy preserving protocol for PCD collection in multi-recipient AMI networks based on the combination of both multi party computation (MPC) and the linear secret sharing LSS. In [30] , each SM splits its PCD into three shares using a linear secret sharing scheme and sends the three shares to three non-colluding DCC servers to carry out the aggregation process. Then, each server reports the aggregation result on the received shares to grid operators and suppliers. Finally, grid operators and suppliers combine the aggregated shares to obtain correct aggregation results. There are main differences between [30] and EPDA. First, in [30] , since BAN-GWs relay the three shares to next gateways, they must be considered as trusted entities with respect to SMs, otherwise, they can learn the PCD of SMs by combining the three shares. Unlike that, EPDA considers the BAN-GWs as honest-but-curious entities. Second, EPDA allows decentralized aggregation as [28] and [29] , i.e., PCD is being aggregated in a bottom-up manner by the different gateways as the data is transmitted to the DCC. On contrary in [30] , the gateways only relay the users' shares to the DCC servers and then aggregation is done centrally at the DCC servers. Therefore, due to these differences between EPDA and [30] , we will evaluate the performance of EPDA against [28] and [29] .
III. SYSTEM MODELS
In this section, we describe the considered network and threat models. Also, we define the functional and security requirements. The main notations used in this paper are given Table 2 . 
A. NETWORK MODEL
As shown in Figure 1 , our network model considers a multirecipients AMI network. In specific, the network model consists of the following entities.
• Transmission System Operator (TSO). It has the responsibility of balancing the entire grid. For example, National Grid Electricity Transmission plc (NGET) is the TSO for the Great Britain grid [41] .
• Distribution Network Operators (DNOs). We consider a set of DNO companies,
Each D j is licensed to distribute electricity in a particular geographic area j. Also, DNOs charge electricity suppliers distribution fees to transport electricity to users.
• Electricity Suppliers. We consider a set of electricity supplier companies,
is responsible for supplying electricity to its users who may be located at different DNOs coverage areas.
• Users. We consider a set of users
Users can choose only one electricity supplier from the suppliers' set S and can change from one supplier to another at any time. Each user is equipped with a SM to encrypt its PCD, r j,k i , and report the EPCD to the DCC through networking facilities.
• Data Communication Company (DCC). It has the responsibility of delivering users' AEPCD to each DNO, and each supplier.
• Networking Facilities. They form a hierarchical network structure to connect SMs at users' side to the DCC through a BAN-GW, a NAN-GW, and a WAN-GW as shown in Fig. Figure 1 .
B. THREAT MODEL
Users are considered honest-but-curious. They will correctly report their PCD to their intended recipients, however, they may try to learn individual's PCD of other users, e.g., their neighbors. DNOs and suppliers are also considered honestbut-curious. They may try to learn individual's PCD. In additions, DNOs may try to learn the APCD of any group of users located at other DNOs areas, whereas suppliers may try to learn the APCD of any group of users supplied by other competitor suppliers. Moreover, a supplier may try to learn the customer distribution of other suppliers in any area so that it can customize offers to attract competitors' customers. The DCC and the gateways are honest-but-curious. They follow the proposed scheme, but they may try to learn the PCD of any individual user, the APCD of any group of users within a DNO area, and/or the APCD of any group of users supplied by a specific supplier. Most importantly, they may try to learn the customers' distribution of each supplier within their areas. In addition, suppliers and DNOs may collude with the DCC to launch successful attacks.
C. DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
Based on the multi-recipient AMI network objectives and the aforementioned threat model, the proposed scheme should achieve the following functional and security requirements.
1) FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
For multi-recipient AMI network, the following functional requirements should be met at each reporting period [28] . 
, which is the APCD of the users in each area j so that S k can be assured that it pays the correct distribution network fees to each DNO D j , i.e., it is not over/under charged.
which is the APCD of the users supplied by S k in all areas in order that S k can accurately predict customers' demands to avoid any potential imbalance penalties. (F3) In order to balance the grid efficiently, the TSO should have access to (a) R j,S for each area j.
i which is the APCD of all users in the system.
2) SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
At each reporting period, the following security requirements should be met. Each recipient should be able to access only the APCD intended to it and should not be able to access APCD of other recipients. (S3) Confidentiality of customer distribution of each supplier. External entities, DNOs, electricity suppliers, should not be able to learn the customers' distribution of other suppliers for fair electricity market.
IV. PRELIMINARIES A. k-NEAREST NEIGHBOR ENCRYPTION TECHNIQUE
Secure computation over encrypted data using the k-nearest neighbor (kNN) similarity measurement has been widely used in several applications such as keyword searching [42] - [49] , and location-based applications [50] - [54] . Based on, but not limited to, the kNN similarity measurement, we develop EPDA that allows data re-encryption to allow fine-grained access control. The schemes proposed in [42] - [53] allows only secure dot product computation between two data vectors without revealing the content of the two vectors to ensure data confidentiality. Different from these schemes, we allow in EPDA secure computation of element-wise multiplication of more than two vectors.
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This can be used as a proxy re-encryption scheme that can allow full or partial data access after re-encryption as need.
B. BILINEAR PAIRING BASED AGGREGATE SIGNATURE
Let G be a multiplicative cyclic group of prime order q, g be a generator of G, and G T be a multiplicative cyclic group of the same prime order q. Suppose a computable bilinear pairing e : G × G → G T . with the following properties:
Based on this bilinear pairing, an aggregate signature scheme [55] can be constructed such that multiple signatures computed on different messages by different users, an aggregate signature can be easily computed and verified in a batch way. The scheme employs a hash function H defined as H : {0, 1} * → G 1) Key Generation. For a particular user u i , pick a random number x i ∈ Z * q as a user's secret key, and compute v i = g x i ∈ G as the corresponding public key. 2) Signing. Given a message m i ∈ {0, 1} * , a user u i uses his secret key x i to compute a signature 
V. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
A. OVERVIEW Figure 2 shows an overview of the information flow in EPDA. First, users encrypt their PCD and send EPCD to their BAN-GWs as shown in the figure. Then, all the gateways perform data aggregation process until the AEPCD reaches the DCC. The DCC performs the re-encryption process to ensure fine-grained access control and then distribute the reencrypted ciphertexts, one to each DNO and supplier. Finally, each DNO and supplier performs a single decryption process to recover the APCD intended to them without revealing APCD intended to other recipients. The details of these phases are explained in subsection V-C, subsection V-D, subsection V-E, and subsection V-F, respectively. Figure 3 , shows an example of the data reported and the access control process. As shown in the figure, a plaintext vector of size v = N d × N s for the multi-recipient AMI network should be used by all users. Each element in the plaintext vector is assigned to a specific DNO and a specific supplier at the same time. As shown in the figure, user u i in the area of D j and supplied by S k builds its plaintext data vector, P i , by reporting its PCD, r j,k i , in the location intended for both D j and S k , and sets all other locations in the data vector to zeros. Then, P i is encrypted and aggregated with other users' encrypted vectors to produce an aggregated encrypted vector, C agg , which is the encryption of P agg as will be explained later in this section. No entity should be able to decrypt C agg to obtain P agg since P agg contains all the APCD intended for all entities in the network. Therefore, access control process is required such that each recipient should be able to access only the data intended to it. Access control is achieved by the proposed secure element-wise multiplication between P agg and the access control vector Q k as will be explained later in the re-encryption process give in subsection V-E. For instance, the figure shows the access control process for S k in which all the APCD should be hidden except the data intended to S k . As shown in the figure, the elementwise product between P agg and Q k contains only the data intended to S k . Therefore, no entity except S k should be able to get this result. This can be achieved by another elementwise multiplication process by a decryption vector R k , owned by a recipient S k , such that S k is the only entity that can obtain P k agg as will be explained in the decryption process given in subsection V-F. It should be noted that, the access control vector Q k and the decryption vector R k are the same for the same recipient S k . Also, each other supplier and DNO will have a unique access control vector and a decryption vector to achieve the functional and security requirements defined earlier.
Adding or removing recipients after system initialization can be done as follows. In case a recipient leaves the system, the consumers of that recipient will use the same vector structure but report their PCD in the element corresponding to their new recipient. In addition, during system initialization, several redundant elements can be added to the data vector for future use, e.g., in case a new recipient is to be added to the system. Moreover, like any secure communication protocol, the keys should be frequently updated for better security. Therefore, during key updates, the unused elements corresponding to the removed recipients can be removed, or if the number of recipients to be added is greater than the redundant elements, the keys should be updated. It should be noted that, adding or removing a recipient is not a very frequent event and thus it will be rare that the keys are updated to add a new recipient after consuming all the elements allocated for future use.
B. SYSTEM SETUP
An offline trusted authority (TA) is needed to setup the system. System setup consists of the following phases (1) generation of public system parameters, (2) generation of private/public pairs to be used in signing/verifying the exchanged messages and (3) generation of the kNN encryption, re-encryption, and decryption keys to be used by users, DCC, and recipients, respectively.
1) GENERATION OF PUBLIC SYSTEM PARAMETER
The TA should generate the bilinear pairing parameters q, G, G T , g,ê and chooses a hash function H : {0, 1} * → G. Then, it publishes the system public parameters as pubs = {q, G, G T , g,ê, H }.
2) GENERATION OF PUBLIC/PRIVATE KEY PAIRS
Each user u i chooses a secret key x i ∈ Z * q and computes the corresponding public key Y i = g x i ∈ G. Similarly, each BAN-GW bg α , each NAN-GW ng β , each WAN-GW wg γ , and the DCC generate public/private key pairs (x α /Y α ), (x β /Y β ), (x γ /Y γ ), and (x dcc /Y dcc ), respectively. Each user and the DCC should obtain a digital certificate from the TA to certify their public keys, while the DCC should generate a certificates for each GW.
3) GENERATION OF KNN ENCRYPTION, RE-ENCRYPTION AND DECRYPTION KEYS
The TA generates a random vector S to be used as a splitting indicator for the kNN encryption technique. The size of S is v = N d × N s . Each element in S is either 0, 1, or 2. Then, the TA generates two master key sets,
where each element in the key sets is a v × v invertible random matrix. MK 1 is used to derive a unique encryption key for each user, both sets are used to generate a unique re-encryption and access control key for each DNO/supplier, and MK 2 is used to derive a unique decryption key for each DNO/supplier.
a: GENERATION OF USERS' ENCRYPTION KEYS
For each user u i , the TA uses MK 1 to generate a unique encryption key EK i which consists of 4 parts Finally, the TA should send EK i to user u i via a secure channel. It should be noted that whenever a user joins/leaves the system or even changes his electricity supplier, he can use the same encryption key and does not need to receive a new one.
b: GENERATION OF RE-ENCRYPTION KEYS
Using MK 1 and MK 2 , the TA generates (N d + N s ) reencryption keys, one for each DNO and for each supplier, and send them to the DCC. Re-encryption key for supplier S k is computed through the following steps. First, the access control binary vector Q k is created by setting the bit locations for S k to ones, i.e., setting the locations for D j , S k for all 1 ≤ j ≤ N d , and then, all other bits are set to zeros. An example of Q k is shown in Figure 3 . Then, Q k is split into two vectors q k and q k as follows. For each element z, 1 ≤ z ≤ v in the splitting indicator S, if S(z) is 1, then q k (z) and q k (z) are set to two random numbers such that q k (z) + q k (z) = Q k (z), while if S(z) is zero or two, then q k (z) and q k (z) are set equal to Q k (z). Then, q k and q k are extended to two symmetric square diagonal matricesq k andq k respectively. This extension will allow the secure element-wise multiplication of the data vectors instead of obtaining the dot product as in previous kNN-based schemes [42] - [53] . Finally, the re-encryption and access control key RK k for S k is computed as
where RK k consists of 8 parts {RK k1 , . . . , RK k8 }, and each part is a square matrix of size v × v.
In a similar process, a re-encryption and access control key RK j should be computed for each DNO D j . The only difference is that the access control binary vector Q j is created by setting the bit locations intended for D j to ones, i.e., locations for D j , S k for 1 ≤ k ≤ N s are set to ones, and all other bits are set to zeros. Finally, the TA should send all the re-encryption keys to the DCC via a secure channel.
c: GENERATION OF DECRYPTION KEYS
Using MK 2 , the TA generates a decryption key for each DNO and supplier in the system. Decryption key for S k is computed through the following steps. First, a decryption binary vector R k is created exactly as the access control vector Q k . Then, R k is split into two vectors r k and r k as follows. For each element z in S, if S(z) is two, then r k (z) and r k (z) are set to two random numbers such r k (z) + r k (z) = R k (z), while if S(z) is zero or one, then r k (z) and r k (z) are set similar to R k (z). Then, r k and r k are extended into two symmetric square diagonal matricesr k andr k respectively. Finally, the decryption key DK k for S k is computed as
2 . In a similar process, decryption key DK j for each DNO D j should be created using a decryption vector R j . Finally, the TA should send each decryption key to its corresponding recipient via a secure channel.
C. USERS: DATA ENCRYPTION
At each reporting period, each user u i should report its EPCD to its local BAN-GW bg α by performing the following steps.
• Step 1: Build a plaintext data vector P i by placing the PCD, r j,k i , at the location in the data vector for D j and S k and set all other elements to zeros.
• Step 2: Split P i into two random vectors p i and p i as follows. For each element z in S, if S(z) is zero, then p i (z) and p i (z) are set to two random numbers such that
, while if S(z) is one or two, then p i (z) and p i (z) are set equal to P i (z).
• Step 3: Generate a ciphertext C i using p i , p i and the encryption key EK i as
where C i is a row vector of size 1 × 4v.
• Step 4: Use its private key x i to generate a signature σ i on C i
where TS is a timestamp.
•
Step 5: Report to bg α the following message
D. GATEWAYS: EFFICIENT AND DECENTRALIZED AGGREGATION
After collecting N α reports from N α users, each BAN-GW bg α should verify the received signatures, aggregate the received ciphertexts into a single one, and send a message to its NAN-GW ng β by performing the following steps
• Step 1: Check the freshness of the timestamps to thwart replay attacks.
• Step 2: Verify the received signatures to ensure reports' integrity and the authenticity of reports' senders. Efficient batch verification process can be done by checkinĝ
Step 3: Compute the aggregated ciphertext C α as
where C α is a row vector of size 1 × 4v.
• Step 4: Use its private key x α to compute the signature
Step 5: Report to its NAN-GW ng β the following message
The operations done by each NAN-GW ng β and each WAN-GW wg γ are exactly the same as those done by each BAN-GW bg α . Finally, each WAN-GW wg γ should send to the DCC the following message
E. DCC: AGGREGATION, RE-ENCRYPTION AND ACCESS CONTROL
After collecting N reports from N WAN-GWs, the DCC should verify the received signatures, aggregate the received ciphertexts, re-encrypt the aggregated ciphertext such that each DNO and each supplier should access only the data intended to it, i.e., re-encryption is done to achieve access control, and then forward each re-encrypted ciphertext to its intended DNO/supplier. The DCC should carry out the following steps • Step 1: Check the freshness of the timestamps.
• Step 2: Perform batch signature verification process to verify the received signatures by checkinĝ
Step 3: Compute the encrypted aggregated ciphertext C agg for all the N u users as
where C agg is a row vector of size 1 × 4v.
• Step 4: Re-encrypt C agg to generate C D,k , where C D,k is the AEPCD intended to supplier S k for the set of all DNOs D in all areas. Re-encryption and access control are done using the re-encryption and access control key RK k through the following operation
where C D,k is a row vector of size 1 × 4v and
The correctness proof of the first component of C D,k is as follows
Similarly, we can prove the correctness of the other components of C D,k . As shown in Equation 1, the result of the re-encryption process is a new ciphertext encrypted under the key set MK 2 instead of MK 1 . In addition, C D,k represents the encryption of the elementwise product between the access control vector Q k and P agg = N u i=1 P i , which is the aggregation of all plaintext data vectors, i.e. S k can access only the aggregated data in the locations specified by the TA while creating the access control vector Q k .
• Step 5: Use its private key x dcc to compute the signature
Step 6: Forward to S k the following message
The DCC should repeat steps 4, 5, and 6 for each DNO D j and each supplier S k by utilizing the corresponding re-encryption keys RK j and RK k respectively.
F. DNO AND SUPPLIER: DECRYPTION AND AGGREGATED DATA RECOVERY
Supplier S k should verify the received signature from the DCC, and decrypt the received ciphertext C D,k to obtain P D,k agg by performing the following steps.
• Step 1: Check the freshness of the timestamp.
• Step 2: Verify the DCC signature by checkinĝ
Step 3: Decrypt C D,k to obtain P D,k agg using the decryption key DK k through the following operation
where • is the element-wise product of the three vectors P agg , Q k , R k . The correctness proof of Equation 2 is as follows
The result of the decryption process, P D,k agg as shown in Figure 3 which satisfies the functional requirement (F3b).
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS A. PRIVACY PROTECTION OF USER'S POWER CONSUMPTION DATA
As shown in subsection V-C, the plaintext vector P i is encrypted to generate the ciphertext
The security of this encryption algorithm has been proven in the known ciphertext model [46] . Thus, the content of ciphertext cannot be identified. Therefore, privacy protection of P i can be achieved. In addition, users receive unique secret encryption keys from the TA generated from the master key set MK 1 . Thus, a user u j who has an encryption key EK j = {a j N 1 , b j N 2 , c j N 3 , d j N 4 } cannot decrypt the ciphertext C i generated by another user u i [49] . Therefore, EPDA satisfies the security requirement (S1).
B. ACCESS CONTROL AND CONFIDENTIALITY OF EACH SUPPLIER/DNO'S APCD
As shown in subsection V-E, the aggregated ciphertext C agg contains all the APCD intended for all DNOs and suppliers. C agg is still a ciphertext encrypted under the master key set MK 1 , which has been shown to be secured as discussed in the previous subsection. Thus, the DCC cannot learn any information about the APCD intended for any DNO or supplier.
Access control is achieved through the re-encryption process presented in subsection V-E. The re-encryption process transforms the ciphertext encrypted under MK 1 into a cipher text encrypted under MK 2 . Since each DNO and supplier has a decryption key derived from MK 2 , they may try to decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertext intended for other competitor DNOs/suppliers. However, the re-encryption process also limits the access only to the intended DNO/supplier through the secure multiplication of the aggregated vector P agg by the access control vector Q k of a supplier S k . Thus, a re-encrypted ciphertext C D,k agg intended for S k cannot be decrypted by another supplier (S , k = ) because the element-wise product of the access control vector Q k that was used in the reencryption and the decryption vector R that will be used in the decryption process will result in a vector of zeros. Therefore, EPDA can satisfy the security requirement (S2).
C. CONFIDENTIALITY OF CUSTOMER DISTRIBUTION OF EACH SUPPLIER
The scheme in [29] reveals the customer distribution of each supplier for functionality. This is because the access policy that identifies which supplier should access the APCD is sent in clear. Therefore, internal and external entities can learn the customer distribution of each supplier in the system. For [28] , external entities cannot learn the customers' distribution of any supplier since suppliers' IDs are sent from users to BAN-GWs in an encrypted form. However, BAN-GWs, controlled by the DCC, must know the supplier of each user so that the ciphertexts of each group of users under a specific supplier can be aggregated together. On the other hand, in EPDA, this information is hidden by the encryption of the plaintext vector and the scheme allows BAN-GWs to aggregate all the ciphertexts for all users, even if they are supplied by different suppliers, into a single ciphertext without revealing the supplier of each user. Therefore, EPDA can satisfy (S3), whereas [29] cannot.
D. COLLUSION BETWEEN DCC AND DNO
In [28] , the electricity supplier receives a ciphertext of the APCD in an area j from the DCC. It also receives the APCD and a random number from the DNO. Electricity suppliers do not trust the DNOs, therefore, in order to ensure the correctness of the APCD received from the DNO, the suppliers should first encrypt the received APCD from the DNO using its public key and the provided random number, and then compare the result with the received ciphertext from the trusted DCC. If they are equal, then the supplier accepts the APCD, otherwise, the DNO has sent higher APCD to charge the supplier more distribution network fees. If the DCC is an active adversaries, it can collude with the DNO to deceive a supplier as follows. First, the DNO encrypts a false APCD using its public key and send the result to the DCC. The DCC will forward this false ciphertext to the supplier instead of sending the correct one. Finally, the DNO will send the false APCD to the supplier. In this way, the correctness of the false APCD will be ensured and thus the supplier pays the DNO higher network distribution fees.
This type of collusion is not possible in EPDA. As shown in Figure 2 , a supplier receives only a single ciphertext from the DCC and can decrypt it directly using its decryption key. Neither the DNO nor the DCC can modify this ciphertext since the modification of the re-encrypted ciphertext requires the knowledge of the master secret key MK 2 . Thus, EPDA can resist the collusion attack between the DCC and the DNO if they are active adversaries, whereas [28] can resist it only if the DCC is trusted. It should be noted that [29] assumes this type of collusion cannot happen since the DCC has to be a trusted entity and can access all the APCD of all recipients.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section we evaluate the performance of EPDA in terms of the computation cost required by each entity and the communication overhead incurred between each two entities in the network. We also compare the performance of EPDA with [28] and [29] .
A. COMPUTATION COST
To evaluate the computation cost of EPDA, we implemented number-theoretic based methods of cryptography using Python charm cryptographic library [56] running on an Intel Core i7-4765T 2.00 GHz and 8 GB RAM. We used supersingular elliptic curve (SS512 curve) with the symmetric Type 1 pairing to realize the bilinear pairing operation [57] . The size of the parameter q is 512 bits. The measurement of the cryptographic operations required in EPDA are reported in the upper part of Table 3 , those needed in [28] and [29] are reported in the lower part of the table, and the operations used in all the schemes are reported in the middle part of the table. As explained in section V, for each reporting period in EPDA, each SM should: (1) perform one vector encryption operation which requires T ve , and (2) compute one signature which requires T h + T e . A BAN-GW should: (1) verify the received N α signatures which requires ( (2) aggregate N α encrypted vectors which requires (N α − 1)T va , and (3) compute one signature which requires T h + T e . The NAN-GWs, the WAN-GWs, and the DCC perform the same operations as a BAN-GW for the received N β , N γ , and N messages respectively. In addition, in EPDA the DCC (1) performs one re-encryption operation for each DNO and each supplier in the system which requires (N d + N s )T vr , and (2) signs (N d + N s ) messages, one for each recipient, which requires (N d + N s )(T h + T e ). Finally, each DNO and each supplier (1) verifies one received signature which requires 2T p + T h , and (2) decrypts the re-encrypted vector which requires T vd .
In [28] , each SM performs (1) one Paillier cryptosystem encryption operation which requires T pe , and (2) For [29] , the operations done by each SM, BAN-GW, NAN-GW, and WAN-GW are exactly the same as in [28] with the difference that [29] sends an access policy with the ciphertext instead of sending the supplier IDs as in [28] . However, in [29] the DCC is a trusted node that decrypts all the received ciphertexts and encrypts them using ABE to ensure fine-grained access control. Specifically, the DCC receives In Table 4 , we summarize the computation cost needed for EPDA, [28] and [29] . In Figure 4 , we compare the computation cost of EPDA against [28] and [29] for each entity in the AMI network. We set N d = 14 as in [28] to model an AMI network that can cover the entire grid in UK [58] . Figure 4a shows the computation cost for each SM versus the number of suppliers in the network. As shown in the figure, the computation cost required by each SM in EPDA increases slightly as the number of suppliers increases. This is because the data vector size depends on the number of suppliers, and thus more arithmetic addition and multiplication operations are needed during the vector encryption process. Also, the figure shows that EPDA is much more efficient than [28] , [29] . This is because the encryption process in EPDA requires only efficient arithmetic addition and multiplication operations compared to the computationally expensive Paillier encryption time, T pe , required in other schemes. Therefore, EPDA is more suitable than other schemes for the resource-constrained SMs due to its lower computational cost. Figure 4b shows the computation cost for each BAN-GW versus the number of user under each BAN-GW at N s = 15 and N s = 30. The computation cost of all the schemes are almost the same. Although the schemes require different times to aggregate the received ciphertexts from the users, the signature verification process, which is the same in all schemes, consumes the most time. On contrary, Figures 4c,  and 4d show that EPDA has better performance than [28] and [29] for the NAN-GWs and WNA-GWs computations. In [28] and [29] , each NAN-GW/WAN-GW receives N s ciphertexts from each of its BAN-GW/NAN-GW children. Thus, as the number of suppliers increases, more aggregation operations are needed. Although the vector size in EPDA also increases linearly with the number of suppliers, which means more arithmetic operations are need for aggregation, EPDA has lower aggregation time than other schemes that aggregates Paillier ciphertexts. Figure 4e shows the computation cost required by the DCC versus the number of suppliers in the network. It is clear that the computation cost of the DCC in [29] is worst compared to EPDA and [28] . This is because in [29] the DCC is a trusted node that decrypts N d N s Paillier ciphertexts and encrypts them using ABE as explained earlier. In Figure 4f , we excluded [29] to compare EPDA against [28] and the figure shows that the DCC in EPDA has lower computation time than [28] .
In Figure 4g we compare the computation cost required by each DNO versus the number of suppliers in the network while Figure 4h shows the computations required by each supplier versus the number of DNOs. It can be seen in the figure that EPDA is the most efficient while [28] is the worst. This is because in EPDA only one vector decryption operation is requires which is much more efficient than either Paillier decryption operation or the ABE decryption operations.
To sum up, EPDA outperforms other schemes in terms of computation cost at each entity in the network except at BAN-GWs where all the schemes require almost the same computation cost.
B. COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
The communication overhead is measured by the size of transmitted messages between the network entities. In the multi-recipient AMI network, the communication overheads that will be measured are for the messages sent from SM to BAN-GW, BAN-GW to NAN-GW, NAN-GW to WAN-GW, WAN-GW to DCC, DCC to DNO, and DCC to supplier. Since the overhead between the intermediate gateways are exactly the same in all schemes, we can evaluate only SM-to-GW, GW-to-DCC, DCC-to-DNO, and DCC-to-Supplier overheads.
In EPDA, each SM sends a message on the form C i ID u i ID bg α TS σ i to its BAN-GW. Thus, the SM-to-GW overhead is the GW-to-DCC overhead is the same as that of SM-to-GW overhead. Similarly, the DCC-to-DNO and the DCC-tosupplier overheads are the same since single vector is sent in either case.
In [28] , each SM sends a message on the form
| is the size of Paillier ciphertext. The messages from the BAN-GW to NAN-GW, NAN-GW to WAN-GW, and WAN-GW to the DCC have the same form and are represented as GW to DCC overhead. These message is on the form of
Since N s ciphertexts corresponding to N s suppliers in the network should be sent to meet the functional requirements, the GW-to-DCC overhead is 3|ID| + N s (|C p | + |ID|) + |TS| + |σ |. Finally, the DCC sends to each DNO in the network a message containing N s ciphertexts with an overhead of (2|ID| + N s (|C p | + |ID|) + |TS| + |σ |. Also, the DCC sends to each supplier in the network a message containing N d ciphertexts with an overhead of 2|ID| + N d (|C p | + |ID|) + |TS| + |σ |. It should be noted that, to meet the functional requirements, [28] requires each DNO to send N s ciphertexts to N s suppliers in the network through secure channels.
We have excluded this additional overhead from our comparison since EPDA and [29] do not require any overhead between DNOs and suppliers.
In [29] , the SM-to-GW overhead and the GW-to-DCC overhead are the same as [28] except that access policy of size |AP| is used instead of supplier IDs to classify Paillier ciphertexts. The DCC-to-DNO overhead is a set of N s ABE ciphertexts with a set of N s access policies. Therefore, the DCC-to-DNO overhead is N s ((1+3L)|C a |+|AP|), where L = 2 is the number of attributes in the access policy, and |C a | is the size of one point in the Elliptic curve group used for ABE. Similarly, the DCC-to-Supplier overhead is Table 5 and compare all the overheads of all the schemes in Figure 5 .
In Figure 5a , we compare the SM-to-GW overhead of EPDA against other schemes. Since AMI networks are typically deployed using wireless mesh networks [59] , we consider two cases in our comparison. In one-hop communication case (Case 1), the SMs and the BAN-GW communicate directly, whereas in multi-hop communication case (Case 2), an SM acts as a router to relay other SMs' messages to the BAN-GW. In the latter case, we assume that each SM relays eight messages for eight children SMs. We denote the number of relayed messages for the children meter as N c as given in Table 5 . As shown in the figure, as the number of suppliers increase ''horizontal axis'', the SM-to-GW overhead in EPDA increases linearly because the vector size in EPDA increases linearly with the number of suppliers, while [28] and [29] have constant overhead. On the other hand, as the number of relayed messages increases in case 2, the SM-to-GW overhead increases in other schemes since the rely nodes cannot classify their children SMs' ciphertexts and thus cannot aggregate them, instead, they have to forward all their ciphertexts to the BAN-GW. Unlike that, in EPDA any relay node can aggregate their children SMs' ciphertexts since EPDA does not require ciphertext classification for data aggregation, i.e., the overhead in both cases will be the same for EPDA. In addition, it should be noted that, the linear increment in overhead in EPDA is the cost needed to hide the customers distribution of each recipient in the network to satisfy the security requirement (S3) which cannot be achieved in [28] and [29] .
In Figure 5b , we plot the GW-to-DCC overhead versus the number of suppliers in the network. In EPDA, the GW-to-DCC overhead is exactly the same as the SM-to-GW overhead since all the encrypted vectors are aggregated in one ciphertext before sending them to the DCC. On contrary, [28] and [29] send N s Paillier ciphertext for N s suppliers in the network to meet the functional requirements, and thus, they require increased overhead as compared to EPDA.
In Figure 5c , and Figure 5d , we plot the DCC-to-DNO overhead versus the number of suppliers in the network, and the DCC-to-supplier overhead versus the number of DNOs in the network, respectively. As shown in the figures, EPDA has the least overhead needed. This is because the ABE ciphertext in [29] and the Paillier ciphertext in [28] are larger than the encrypted vector transmitted in EPDA.
Based on the security analysis presented in section VI and the performance evaluation presented in section VII, we summarize in Table 6 the comparison of EPDA against [28] , [29] .
It should be noted that, although EPDA has better computation and communication overheads when compared to [28] and [29] , it uses larger key sizes. The key size in EPDA is 39.48 kB while it is 0.384 kB in [28] and [29] . This is because the key size in EPDA increases with both the number of DNOs and suppliers in the system. Note that, key distribution does not occur very frequently unlike the periodic data collection of PCD. Thus, the increased key size in EPDA does not have a marked impact on the communication overhead.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed EPDA, an efficient and privacypreserving data collection and access control scheme for multi-recipient AMI networks. Based on, but not limited to, the kNN encryption technique, we developed a novel proxy re-encryption scheme that allows data aggregation before reencryption and can allow either full or partial access to the aggregated data after re-encryption as needed. Thus, each recipient can access only the aggregated data intended to it and cannot access the aggregated data intended to other recipients to achieve the functional and security requirements for the multi-recipients AMI networks. Our security analysis demonstrated that EPDA is secure and can ensure better security compared to other data collection schemes. Specifically, EPDA can resist collusion attacks and hide customers's distribution that is needed for fair electricity trade market. Moreover, our performance evaluations showed that EPDA is both computationally and bandwidth-wise efficient compared to similar schemes. 
